Seven must-haves to keep the North Korea nuclear deal (if there is one) from being like Kerry’s Iran disgrace

By Dan Calabrese

I guess this is happening. I want to have high hopes, but how can you when you know you’re negotiating with someone who offers no reason to trust him?

And I still don’t like the idea that this psycho gets to sit one-on-one across the table with the president of the United States. He doesn’t deserve that status as a world leader and there’s no reason to think he’ll do anything positive with it.

But you know our president. He sees himself as a master negotiator – not without some reason – and is convinced he’s the one person who can get North Korea to make a deal that will end its reign of terror as a nuclear threat. So unless something completely bizarre happens before everyone sits down in Singapore tomorrow (which is certainly not impossible given the players), it looks like the meeting is on and we have to hope for the best.

The absolute best would be that Bowl Cut Jr. renounces his claim to power, steps down and allows for free elections, which would essentially end the North Korean regime and bring about the reunification of the Korean peninsula.

Since that is almost certainly not going to happen, let’s consider the most realistic “best” we might be able to get. And that is that any deal looks nothing like the utter disgrace John Kerry negotiated with Iran – the very deal Trump saw as so awful that he rightfully withdrew from it.

Let’s recall why this deal was so bad. There were several fundamental reasons:

  • Obama and Kerry were so desperate to get a deal, any kind of deal, that they were willing to give Iran almost anything it wanted, and the mad mullahs knew it.
  • At times Kerry essentially acted as Iran’s lawyer when the other countries involved in the negotiations wanted tougher terms and stronger inspection methods. Kerry was using his patented method of “getting them to trust him” by bending over backwards to accede to their demands.
  • Obama and Kerry fundamentally rejected the idea that there was any legitimate reason for the United States to be at odds with Iran, so they saw the deal as correcting more than three decades of ill-advised policy.
  • Obama and Kerry didn’t care that Iran would use its newfound wealth to fund terrorism, and put nothing in the deal that would restrict this in the slightest.
  • Obama and Kerry agreed to so many limitations on the inspections – such as long delays against action if Iran objected to a claim of noncompliance – that in practice it’s nearly impossible to prove they’re violating the deal.
  • Obama and Kerry didn’t want to see any evidence that might prove their undertaking was foolhardy, which is why the type of evidence presented recently by Benjamin Netanyahu of Iran’s cheating was never taken seriously, and isn’t now. The “world community” is in love with the fiction that they accomplished something in the Iran deal and doesn’t want to see any information to the contrary.

President Trump cannot approach this like that.

First, he has to be willing to walk away with no deal rather than agree to a bad one. He’ll be ripped by the media if he does, but they’ll find something to rip him for anyway.

Second, he can’t agree to water down the inspection regime to the point where we can’t really get access to North Korea’s nuclear sites.

Third, he can’t put people in charge of the inspections who don’t really want to find anything. No Hans Blixes or Mohammed Al-Baradeis here. In fact, the best plan would be to trust no one but Americans do this. The UN and its IAEA drones need not get involved.

Fourth, the deal should be tied to verifiable human rights concessions. No more killing or jailing political enemies. No more persecuting people of faith. No more killing free speech. Why? Because you can’t trust a regime that squashes basic freedoms. Such a regime will always look for ways to get a new strategic upper hand.

Fifth, North Korea gets nothing from us until they prove compliance. No relaxing of sanctions or anything else. The first step must be theirs.

Sixth, it’s not on us to prove they’re not complying. It’s on them to prove they are. Or we can take any action we want to punish them.

Seventh, no restrictions on the U.S. military presence in South Korea, nor on joint military exercises there. We are not giving up our own strategic advantages to help North Korea.

These are the conditions on which Trump needs to insist in order to even consider a deal. If Kim won’t agree, Trump walks away. He’ll get no deal and no Nobel Peace Prize (er . . . he’s never going to get that anyway, and it means nothing if he does), but he’ll have protected the strategic interests of America.

That’s something Barack Obama and John Kerry never did in their dealings with Iran, because they never cared to. For God’s sake let’s not repeat that travesty in Singapore tomorrow.

Dan writes Christian spiritual warfare novels and does all kinds of other weird things too. Follow all his activity by liking him on Facebook!